This study examines the effect of investor protection on the firm value, either directly or through the implementation of corporate governance as an intervening variable in 10 countries in Asia. Investor protection as independent variable was measured by the score of investor protection consisting of legal tradition, corporate law and enforcement, and securities law. Firm value as the dependent variable was measured with Tobin's q. The research hypotheses were tested using partial least square model.
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Muryati and Suardhika (2014) examined the influence of corporate governance on corporate values with internal mechanisms (managerial ownership, independent board of commissioners, boards of directors, independent audit committees, and external institutional ownership mechanisms) in banking companies listed on BEI in [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] and found that corporate governance had an effect on corporate value. Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006) examined the relationship between corporate governance and the quality of the firm's earnings and values. The results of the study found that corporate governance affects the quality of earnings, the quality of profit affects firm values, and corporate governance affects firm value.
The legal approach of La Porta et al. (2002) in 27 countries with a prosperous economy found that the better the investor protection impacted, the better the company's value. La Porta et al. (2000) have proven that, in some countries, expropriation by managers and controlling shareholders of minority shareholders and creditors is enormous. They also state that the law and the quality of its implementation are important determinants of what rights the securities holders hold and how well those rights are protected. According to Klapper and Love (2004) , the legal environment relating to the protection of investors in a country will affect the application of corporate governance at the corporate level. Klapper and Love (2004) examined investor protection relationships against corporate governance and market valuation. The results of this study found that the better the corporate governance, the better the market valuation. Corporate governance is important for companies in countries with weak investor protection. Corporate governance is seen to compensate for weak investor protection. Wardhani (2009) examined the effect of investor protection on the implementation of corporate governance in Asian countries. The results of this study found that investor protection has a positive effect on the implementation of corporate governance.
Previous studies have examined the effect of investor protection on corporate governance and the influence of corporate governance on corporate value. However, these studies have not considered the implementation of corporate governance, which may be additional in the protection of investors as intervening variables in estimating the effect of investor protection on firm value. Previous researches underlie the researcher's examination of the influence between investor protection, corporate governance implementation, and firm value on companies listed in Asian stock exchanges in the range of 2010-2012. ICOI-2018 The results of this study are expected to academically increase the knowledge and understanding of the relationship of investor protection, corporate governance implementation, and corporate values as well as provide a reference and basis for conducting further research. As for practice, it can be used as input and consideration of management in decision-making relevant to the company.
Literature Reviews

Agency theory
Agency theory is defined as one in which one or more people (investors) involve others (agents) to perform some services on their behalf, one of which includes delegating authority over decision-making to agents ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . The problem here is that financiers and agents can choose different actions because of differences in risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989 ). Brigham and Houston (2006) argue that signaling theory is a behavior of corporate management in giving direction to investors related to management views on the prospects of the company for the future. Ross (1977) stated that the company signals for the market to gain insight about the quality of the company.
Signaling theory
Investor protection
Investor protection can be defined as degree to which law and its enforcement protect investors from insiders' expropriation. La Porta et al. (1996) explain how investor protection is done through the mechanisms of a legal tradition, law and enforcement, and securities law. La Porta et al. (1996) classified this according to legal origin, divided into two major groups: common law and civil law. A country with legal origin common law protects its investors better for minority shareholders compared to countries with legal origin civil law (La Porta et al., 1996) . 
Firm value
The value of the firm is the price that would be paid by the prospective buyer if the company is sold (Husnan and Pudjiastuti, 2004) . If stock prices are high, firm value will also be high; and vice versa (Fakhruddin and Hadianto, 2001) . The value of the company can provide maximum prosperity if the stock price increases (Nurlela and Islahuddin, 2008). 
Hypothesis development
The effect of investor protection on firm value
The effect of investor protection on corporate governance implementation
The effect of implementation of corporate governance on firm value
Agency relationship is a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal; there will be some divergence between the agent's decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Corporate governance principles implementation has been believed as having an important role to reduce agency conflict.
Good corporate governance performance will increase value added for all parties and value of the firm as well.
H3: Implementation of Corporate Governance affects Value of The Firm. Klapper 
The effect of investor protection on the value of the firm nilai perusahaan regarding corporate governance implementation as an intervening variable
Research framework
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Research Methods
The dependent variable used in this study is firm value calculated using Tobin's Q Ratio.
The 
Model analysis and hypothesis verification
Outer mode measurement estimation
The initial structural model used in this study can be seen in Figure 1 .
Based on the result of outer loading factor shown in Figure 2 , it can use the outer loading factor value table for the first iteration. Table 2 describes the reflective value of the indicator for each variable. It is shown in Table 2 that all proxies have an outer loading factor greater than 0.5. It can be concluded that all proxies are eligible to be an indicator that can reflect on each of the corresponding variables. The results in Table   2 can also conclude that the first iteration is the final iteration to determine the proxy used as a reflective indicator of each variable. 
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Inner model measurement estimation
Investor protection influence toward firm value
Based on the results in Table 4 , it can be concluded that investor protection does not affect the value of the company. This can be seen based on p-value greater than 0.1 (0.158 < 0.1). As presented, the value of the estimated original regression coefficient (original sample) that is equal to 0.629, it can be concluded that investor protection is positively related to firm value. The positive value of the regression coefficient indicates a unidirectional relationship between investor protection and firm value, where ICOI-2018 if investor protection increases once, then the value of the company will increase by 0.629 times. Based on the p-value and regression coefficients to see the effect of investor protection against firm value, it can be concluded that investor protection does not affect the value of the company. This shows that hypothesis 1 which states that investor protection has an effect on the company's value is not proven.
Investor protection influence toward the corporate governance implementation
Based on the results in Table 5 , it can be concluded that investor protection has an effect on the implementation of corporate governance. This can be seen based on pvalue smaller than 0.01 (0.000 < 0.01). Based on the value of the estimated original regression coefficient (original sample) that is equal to 0.782, it can be concluded that investor protection has a positive effect on the implementation of corporate governance. The positive value of the regression coefficient shows the one-way relationship between investor protection and the implementation of corporate governance, where, if investor protection increases once, then the implementation of corporate governance will increase by 0.782 times. 
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Based on the value of p-value and regression coefficients to see the effect of investor protection on the implementation of corporate governance, it can be concluded that investor protection has a positive effect on the implementation of corporate governance. This supports hypothesis 2, which states that investor protection has a significant effect on the implementation of corporate governance.
Corporate governance implementation influence to firm value
Based on the results in Based on the p-value and regression coefficients, it can be concluded that the implementation of corporate governance negatively affects the value of the company. This supports hypothesis 3, which states that investor protection has a significant effect on the implementation of corporate governance.
Investor Protection Influence toward Firm Value with Corporate Governance Implementation as the Intervening Variable
Based on the results in Table 7 , it can be concluded that the implementation of corporate governance is a variable that can mediate the influence of investor protection against corporate value. This can be seen based on p-value results that are smaller than 0.05 (0.015 < 0.05). Based on the value of Sobel Test and regression coefficients, it can be concluded that the implementation of corporate governance has an effect on mediating the influence of investor protection against firm value. This indicates that hypothesis 4, which states that investor protection against corporate value with the implementation of corporate governance, is not proven. which is information about the power of law in a country that protects investors in the country, does not affect the value of the company. Investors pay more attention to information about the return on their investment than information about the protection of their rights as investors. The belief is that the state has guaranteed their rights as investors.
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Discussion
Investor protection influence toward firm value
Investor protection influence toward corporate governance implementation
Hypothesis 2 (H2) states that investor protection affects the implementation of corporate governance. The result of the research shows that investor protection influences the implementation of corporate governance and proves significant.
The results of this study prove that the implementation of corporate governance is a reflection of investor protection in a country and whether or not the implementation of corporate governance can be seen from the score of corporate governance owned by the nation. This study proves that there are five measures of corporate governance implementation that reflect how corporate governance is run to support corporate governance: CG rules and practices, enforcement, political and regulatory environments, accounting and auditing, and CG culture. Companies will base on investor protection of the nation in the making of CG rules and practices because the CG rules and practices will certainly adapt to the legal basis protecting investors in the nation.
Enforcement in corporate governance is also influenced by investor protection. Poor investor protection indicates that the enforcement of corporate governance is also not very strong, and vice versa. Political and regulatory environment reflects the preparation of corporate governance governed by the state and the process is top-down.
Because the state plays a role in this, the strength of investor protection influences the political and regulatory environment. Investor protection is also done by the state through the establishment of institutions that have the authority to set standards; such institutions should be able to establish an accounting standard that can provide protection to investors. How companies, investors, intermediaries, non-profit organizations and media seek to improve corporate governance can be seen from the nation's CG culture. The parties in doing business to improve CG culture will certainly pay attention to how investors are protected in a nation. Therefore, investor protection also affects CG culture.
The better value of state investor protection as measured through the average enforcement and corporate law will result in the company better implementing corporate governance. Companies with good investor protection in a nation will also certainly have a higher standard in corporate governance. Companies with good investor protection in a nation will be easier to implement corporate governance. This is because companies can adopt provisions that are similar to the law in that nation. ICOI-2018 The results of this study are in line with research conducted by Klapper and Love (2004) who found the influence of investor protection against corporate governance ranking. Wardhani (2009) also found that investor protection influences the corporate governance index.
This research, in accordance with the research of Klapper and Love (2004) and Wardhani (2009), reinforces the assertion that protecting investors influences the implementation of corporate governance. The better investor protection the nation makes, the better standard of corporate governance and its implementation. If the law on investor protection is not good, it will be difficult to improve the corporate legal environment, which can impact on the difficulty of maximizing corporate governance. shows the investor protection influence of corporate value with the implementation of corporate governance as the mediating variable, but it is not strong enough to become an intervening variable. This is because there is no direct influence between investor protections against corporate value.
Corporate governance implementation influence toward firm value
Investor protection does not affect the value of the company. Investors, while investing, do not pay attention to the protection of investors' rights as they are convinced that their rights are protected by the state. Implementation of corporate governance is a reflection of corporate management. Companies in countries with low corporate governance scores will seek to improve corporate governance at the enterprise level. This is so that investors still believe that they will get a good return from the company. If the company has good corporate governance, it will be shown by a high corporate value. This is in accordance with the results of research by Klapper and Love (2004) and Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006) .
This research proves that investor protection is not a matter of concern by investors when investing in a country. However, investor protection affects the implementation of corporate governance in a country. The implementation of corporate governance ICOI-2018 attracts investors, because it also affects how the company is managed. Companies, if managed properly, will increase investor confidence, which means the company will find it easier in getting funding, so the impact can be seen from the good company value.
Conclusion
Based on the results of testing and analysis, it shows that investor protection does not affect the value of the company and proved significant. Investors pay more attention to information about returns on their investments than information about protecting their rights as investors. Investors are convinced that the state has guaranteed their rights as investors. On the other hand, the result of the analysis shows that investor protection influences the implementation of corporate governance and proves significant.
